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Border is better than distance?  
Contagious corruption in one belt one road economies  
Abstract 
Employing data of one belt one road (OBOR) countries from 2002 to 2013, this 
study compares the contagious corruption difference between geographic border and 
distance through the dynamic spatial econometric model. The empirical results not 
only confirm that corruption in OBOR countries exists under various contagious 
channels, but also indicate that border effects, serving as contagious channels for 
corruption, are better than distance effects. The empirical implication is that OBOR 
countries with a common border tend to possess contagious corruption due to the 
hosts’ demonstration effect and the convenience of transferring illegal assets. We 
advise that those OBOR countries should enhance the supervision of cash flow, look 
for any opportunity of kicking back a portion of the stolen money, and establish a 
specific task force on corruption. 
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1 Introduction 
The existing literature proves that if neighboring countries have similar patterns 
of political culture, then they can affect the host corruption by controlling the 
countries’ economic level (Becker et al., 2009). Frequent economic trade and similar 
political institutions are also confirmed as corruption contagion channels in previous 
literature, leaving the aspects of geographic border and distance unexplored (Sui et al., 
2017). Scholars have investigated the spatial corruption phenomenon and contagious 
corruption, yet most of them ignore the spatial matrix computational methods of 
corruption; in fact, only a few studies in the literature have looked at the difference 
between border and distance contagious channel. Therefore, this research uses the 
data of one belt one road countries over the period 2002-2013 and utilizes spatial 
econometrics as well as the panel generalized method of moments (GMM) model to 
compare the different contagious channels of corruption from a spatial perspective. 
For the above purposes, after confirming the spatial phenomenon via spatial 
autocorrelation, we first establish spatial economic analysis of corruption using GMM, 
seeking the reliable instrumental variables approach to resolve the endogeneity that is 
correlated with the key independent variable, but uncorrelated with the error term. 
Second, we employ different spatial panel GMM models, including a border 
geographic matrix as well as a distance geographic matrix, after controlling the host 
economic and institutional variables. Third, we contribute to a comparison between 
the border geographic channel and the distance geographic channel, which are mostly 
overlooked by the existing literature. This comparison is of great significance for the 
different potential contagious channels by not only determining the optimal potential 
computational method of the spatial corruption matrix, but also offering effective 
anti-corruption measures for policy makers. In the final step, we focus on a special 
region - namely, the one belt one road (OBOR) countries. Here, the worse level of 
corruption control is convenient for comparing different geographic contagious 
channels of corruption and for analyzing the issue from a new economic 
organizational perspective. As a rising international economic collaboration platform, 
this region’s control of corruption is noteworthy for academia and policymaking 
bodies. 
The reason for investigating the different spatial geographic channels of 
corruption in OBOR is rather important. First, host corruption has a demonstration 
effect on neighboring countries that have borders with each other (Accinelli and 
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Sanchez 2012). Countries with common borders always have similar economic, 
political, and cultural characteristics (Becker et al., 2009). Second, in order to protect 
the handling of illegal domestic assets, local officials typically prefer transferring 
them to nearby areas, and such transfers lead to contagious corruption (Attila, 2008), 
especially for these OBOR countries that are particularly vulnerable to corruption. 
Third, as frequent commercial intercourse facilitates contacts among government 
officials and businessmen of multinational corporations, globalization is accelerating 
cross-country corruption. Countries with no shared borders may have contagious 
corruption with each other. Fourth, corrupt behavior disperses via intensive business 
contacts (Kaymak and Bektas, 2015) and international organizations (Becker et al., 
2009). Thus, the spatial distance matrix represents rather well the contagious 
corruption level for countries that have no border with each other.  
Reviewing the previous literature, scholars have presented the relationships 
between corruption and economic growth (Dong and Torgler, 2010). The mechanisms 
that host corruption influences economic growth are called “helping hand” and 
“grabbing hand”, which work based on reducing transaction costs and increasing rent 
seeking, respectively (Bliss and di Tella, 1997; Aidt, 2003; Lopez and Mitra, 2000). 
Some research scholars also consider corruption as the main factor impacting 
innovation, environment, and the capital market. In this respect, Lau et al. (2013) 
provide empirical evidence that real innovation activities have been hindered by the 
effect of bribery on patent applications, implying the “grabbing hand” effect is present 
through the mechanism of corruption on innovation activities. Chang and Hao (2017) 
argue that higher corruption in non-OECD countries decreases the quality of 
government, while a host country with abundant environmental performance makes it 
convenient for creating harmful impacts upon economic growth. Lau et al. (2013) 
utilize firm-level data analysis to investigate the beneficial influence of corruption on 
the stock market. Furthermore, the relationship between globalization and corruption 
has been confirmed by some scholars; Lalountas et al. (2011) find that globalization 
has various impacts on corruption for countries with different income levels. Bojnec 
(2017) utilizes OECD data, revealing a significant positive association pertaining to 
corruption and the host country’s economic globalization.  
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Academia has also shown the linkage between host corruption and nearby 
corruption on the basis of the argument that neighboring countries exhibit an imitation 
behavior for contagious corruption (Rosa et al., 2010). Previous literature on 
corruption has revealed the mechanisms through which host corruption leads to 
decreased competition for corporations (Celentani and Ganuza, 2002; Wilson and 
Damania, 2005), especially for developing countries with lower economic 
development and unstable state power. In fact, corruption plays different roles in 
economic development through the host political power. For instance, Khan (1998) 
reveals the different influences of corruption on an economy by comparing different 
patron-client networks in Asian countries. Talvitie (2017) analyzes the industrial 
organization of corruption in Asia and proposes that the rise of the ‘economic miracle’ 
in Asia is due to corruption and rent-seeking; for instance, the chaebols of South 
Korea and back door of China. The regional economic miracle is characterized by 
inadequate an institutional framework, systemic corruption, and crony capitalism. The 
OBOR countries are almost all located in Asia, and the above characteristics are 
distinctly observed.  
The topic of developing countries’ corruption usually concerns the control of 
corruption. Studies use a professional corruption index (Corruption Perception Index) 
and individual-level survey data to analyze the relationship between corruption and 
governance (Javaid, 2010; Tavits, 2010; Satpayev, 2014). The results reflect that poor 
governance leads to bribery, and that the optimal method for controlling corruption is 
to improve the capacity for strong governance (Mahmood, 2010). Table 1 lists some 
studies on the topic of corruption control in OBOR, covering, for instance, Poland, 
Croatia, Singapore, Mongolia, and others. Satpayev (2014) comparatively analyzes 
the influence of low governance quality of developing countries, revealing that 
corruption is the main reason for their low governance quality. Nguyen et al. (2012) 
utilize micro-enterprise data to investigate the relationship between corruption and 
growth for private firms in Vietnam. Riley and Roy (2016) find that India’s corruption 
on the system of business licensing is clearly present from the 1950s to 1980s. Thus 
far, few scholars in the previous literature have analyzed the contagious corruption 
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phenomenon of OBOR countries.  
Although the existence of the contagious corruption phenomenon has been 
confirmed through the spatial econometric model (Becker et al., 2009; Attila, 2008; 
Sui et al., 2017), the existing literature is still debating what are the “neighbors”. For 
instance, Anselin (2003) defines neighbors based on the concept of whether they 
share a common border. Border countries always have the same historical background 
and similar culture transmission. Research on economic growth, population growth, 
and innovation typically uses a border as the neighbor channel. Porter (1996) focuses 
on the issue of whether knowledge exchanges afforded by border proximity can foster 
regional competitiveness. Firmino Costa et al. (2017) use the border definition as the 
Brazilian population growth spillover channel to analyze urban and rural population 
growth over the period 1970-2010. With globalization and the rapid development of 
new information and communication technologies, others argue that the economy, 
culture, and politics among countries eventually become similar. Countries with no 
borders have played a key role in the world - for instance, the United States, China, 
and so on (Conley and Ligon, 2002). Some scholars prefer using distance to define 
neighbors in globalization related research. Furthermore, Stern and Van Dijk (2017) 
analyze global particulate pollution concentrations through the spatial distance matrix 
of the world.
1
  
The above existing literature suffers from three problems that cast doubt on the 
previous conclusions. First, few scholars define geographic border corruption and 
distance corruption in terms of neighbors. Moreover, there is a lack of concern about 
what is an optimal neighbor in corruption research, with geographic border and 
distance having different influences with various corruption contagion channels. Thus, 
seeking the best contagious corruption channel between geographic border and 
distance is meaningful in the field of political economy. Second, the traditional 
literature mainly targets the relationship between host governance and corruption in 
                                                             
1 Few political economists are concerned about the definition of neighbor in their research on corruption. Anselin 
(2003), Becker et al. (2009), and Márquezet et al. (2011) define the average corruption value as neighbors’ 
corruption, which is the sum of the corruption values of neighbors sharing a common border, and this sum is then 
divided by the number of neighbors. In addition, Attila (2008) expands the defintion of neighbors through 
geographic distance in order to better represent contagious corruption. 
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OBOR, with few choosing OBOR corruption data to investigate the optimal 
contagious channel. As OBOR is a rising regional organization, the control of 
corruption there is an important issue that OBOR should be confronting. Determining 
the effective anti-corruption contagious channel is essential for both academic and 
political bodies. Overall, the empirical results in this paper illustrate the optimal 
contagious corruption channel in OBOR, in which the geographic contagious channel 
of a border is stronger than those distance one.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the tests 
of spatial autocorrelation, the measure of spatial weights, as well as the dynamic panel 
GMM approach. Section 3 reports the estimation results from OBOR countries. 
Finally, section 4 offers some policy implications. 
2 Econometric methodology and model 
2.1 The spatial autocorrelation tests 
Before employing the spatial econometric model, it is essential to investigate 
global spatial autocorrelation if the space dependence of corruption is significant. 
Thus, we utilize the Moran index, Geary index, and Getis-Ord index to test whether 
the space dependence of corruption is significant. The Moran index is expressed as: 
Y X WY       ,                                                  (1) 
where Y denotes a 1N  vector of dependent variables, X  denotes a N N  
matrix of independent variables,   represents the coefficient vector of X, W 
represents the adjacency-related weight, and   is a remainder disturbance term that 
is independently normally distributed. We assume the null hypothesis, 0 : 0H   , 
which means the space dependence of corruption is insignificant and the model is 
shown in model (2); otherwise, 1 : 0H   , which means spatial autocorrelation is 
confirmed. 
Y X     .                                                         (2) 
 The Moran index is calculated as: 
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where S represents the sum of elements in the spatial matrix W, and N is the 
dimensionality of variables. If W is a standardized matrix, then S=N, and the Moran 
index is normally distributed. The Moran index ranges from -1 to 1; a positive Moran 
index reveals positive spatial autocorrelation; and vice versa if the calculated value is 
negative; a Moran index equal to zero reveals that spatial autocorrelation is not 
significant. The mean and variance of Moran statistics are normally distributed as:  
(MW)
(I)
(N K)
N tr
E
S S


,                                               (4) 
where W represents the spatial-weighted matrix, and N represents the number of 
cross-countries; it is noteworthy that M is the mapping matrix 
(
' 1 '(X X) XNM I X
  ), thus establishing Moran’s statistic. 
We use another spatial autocorrelation, named the Getis-Ord index (Getis and 
Ord, 1992), and establish the distance (between the capitals of countries i and j) 
spatial matrix: 
( )
( )
ij i j
i j
w d x x
Getis Ord d
x x
 


,                                 (5) 
where xi and xj correspond to the sample countries of i and j, and wij is the spatial 
matrix. Comparing the Getis-Ord index and its expected value, it is notable that if the 
index statistics are larger than the expected value, then there is high spatial 
agglomeration and vice versa. 
We also adopt the Geary index as an alternative spatial autocorrelation index:  
                
2
2
( 1) ( )
( )
2 ( )
ij i j
i
n w x x
Geary C
x x

 




,                     (6) 
where xi and xj represent the sample observations of i and j, and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the element of 
the spatial matrix. The calculated value represents positive spatial autocorrelation, 
while the Geary index is smaller than one if the calculated value is larger than one, 
and vice versa; moreover, the insignificant autocorrelation reveals the calculated value 
is equal to one. The Geary index is also normally distributed with a range of [0, 2]. 
9 
 
2.2 The measurement of the spatial-weighted matrix 
We should choose suitable spatial weights after investigating if the spatial 
autocorrelation of corruption does exist. The different results of the spatial model are 
caused by introducing different weighted matrices (Pinkse and Slade, 1998; Lesage, 
2000 and Plümper, 2010). We employ the adjacency-related definition, namely border 
(Becker et al., 2009; Márquezet et al., 2011). If a country has a common geographic 
border with others, then the elements of the spatial-weighted matrix are equalt o 1; 
otherwise, 0. If a country has a common border with n countries, then nearby 
countries’ elements of the geographic spatial-weighted matrix are defined as 
1/Gijw n , where n is the number of border neighboring countries. The 
spatial-weighted matrix of N countries is a symmetric matrix that includes elements of 
0 ( N N ) in the leading diagonal. The geographic-weighted matrix reveals whether 
the contagious corruption phenomenon exists through a border. A country that has 
multiple borders with others has a relatively higher probability of being affected by 
contagious corruption.
2
 
We employ a border-weighted matrix to measure the contagious corruption effect 
among OBOR countries.
3
 In order to think over other geographic contagious 
channels and avoid rows being assigned with all zeros, we employ the geographic 
distance-weighted matrix (Becker et al., 2009; Ertur and Koch, 2007; Mayer and 
Zignago, 2011; Goel and Saunoris, 2014).
4
 According to Goel and Saunoris (2014), 
the geographic distance-weighted matrix is defined as 1/
D
ij ijw d , where dij is the 
geographic distance from country capital i to country capital j, and 
jt
DW  reveals the 
                                                             
2
 In order to define the geographic-weighted matrix, we choose land borders rather than maritime 
borders. Thus, we have to abandon some island countries. 
3
 Anselin (1990) argues for delineating a specified circle area that defines a certain distance as the 
radius of a circle, which is the rough measure of the spatial-weighted matrix. 
4
 Reviewing the political economic perspective, contagious corruption is possible in the spatial 
economy. Researchers summarize the institutional characteristics of geographic infection, including 
democracy (Brinks and Coppedge, 2001), liberty (Simmons and Elkins, 2004), and policy choice 
(Meseguer, 2006). Inter-communication in the World Bank and OECD accelerates corruption infection 
(Márquezet et al., 2011; Becker et al., 2009; Attila, 2008). However, our topic concerns what is an 
optimal neighbor from the geographic perspective; thus, we focus on which is a better contagious 
channel between border and distance. 
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geographic distance-weighted matrix.
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2.3 Panel-GMM model 
The traditional literature utilizes the instrument variables (IV) dealing with the 
problem of endogeneity (Ghonghadze and Lux, 2016), and the GMM method also 
provides a reliable IV variable in corruption research (Sekrafi and Sghaier, 2016). 
Since we consider obtaining consistent estimates in the presence of the contagious 
corruption effect in OBOR countries, for purposely dealing with problem of 
endogeneity, the generalized method of moments (GMM) should be utilized (Goel 
and Saunoris, 2014), because it is deemed as a convenient approach to avoid variables’ 
endogeneity, while the traditional approach usually is combined with the estimated 
bias (Fischer et al., 2009; Dettori et al., 2012). 
Following the theory constructed by Goel and Saunoris (2014) and Becker et al. 
(2009), we use the panel-GMM model analyzing the contagious effect of corruption 
in OBOR countries: 
m
it jt jt it 1 i it it
1 1
Corruption α ρ Corruption σCorruption β X ε
N
ii
W 
 
      .
       
(7) 
Here, Corruptionit denotes the host corruption of country i in period t,   denotes the 
spatial lag parameter of the host corruption infected by nearby countries, 
jt jt
1
Corruption
i
N
W


 
reveals the spatial influence of host corruption infected by 
neighboring countries, Xit denotes a control variables matrix, containing institutional 
and economic factors, etc., and it  is remainder disturbance term that is 
independently normally distributed. The matrix formulation is transformed as 
equation (7):  
*
Nt Nt-1 1 Nt NtCorruption α ρ Corruption σCorruption X β εNtW      ,         
(8) 
                                                             
5
 In line with the viewpoint of Goel and Saunoris (2014), distance is a spherical distance, calculated by 
the longitude and latitude of the capitals in the OBOR countries. 
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It is noteworthy that WCorruptionNt-1
 
denotes a 1N  vector of the host countries’ 
corruption as infected by neighboring countries, 
*
1CorruptionNt  represents a 1N  
vector of host corruption at time t-1, X denotes a matrix of control factors, and   
represents the coefficient matrix of control factors. 
11 21 1
12 22 2
1 2
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m
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Based on these explanations, we define 
jt
BW
 
and 
jt
DW
 
as the spatial weights, 
revealing the various spatial weights for different spatial descriptions.  
 We first introduce a geographic border. 
m
it jt it 1 i it it
1 1
Corruption α ρ Corruption σCorruption β X εBj
N
i
t
i
W 
 
     
       
(9) 
Geographic border weighted matrix 
12 1
21 2
1 2
0
0
0
N
N
jt
N N
b b
b b
B
b b
N N
w w
w w
W
w w

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Here, 
jt
BW  reflects whether there is a common border between the host country and 
nearby countries. We then consider introducing the spatial-weighted matrix of 
geographic distance as follows:  
 
m
' ' '
it jt it 1 it it
1 1
Corruption α ρ Corruption σCorruption β X εDjt i
i
N
i
W 
 
     
      
(10) 
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The set-ups of 
jt
DW  are similar to 
jt
BW .
 3 Empirical results 
3.1 Data and variables 
The data of 33 countries (shown in Figure 3) over the period 2002-2013 are 
mainly collected from both World Development Indicators (WDI) and Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). The main variable in our empirical model is the index 
control of corruption (Corruption), whereby corruption offers a chance for 
bureaucrats utilizing public power to take private gains. The range of index control of 
corruption is [-2.5, 2.5]. In addition, we build two potential geographic channels to 
detect whether the contagious corruption phenomenon exists in the OBOR countries. 
We consider the geographic border (
B
jtW Corruption ) channel and the geographic 
distance (
D
jtW Corruption ) channel. This paper also considers choosing other factors 
of corruption for eliminating omitted variable bias.  
According to previous literature, economic development and political institution 
may contribute to the level of corruption, and we thus include the following economic 
variables in our estimated models:  (1) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
(Real GDP per Capita), revealing that high-level income may increase corruption 
(Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2000; Scott, 1969; Tanzi, 2000; Orttung, 2006). The strict 
size of a state matters for leading corruption, because lower levels of bureaucratic 
quality bring about more chances for the appearance of contagious corruption in a 
society (Mbaku, 1996; Orttung, 2006); (2) trade openness (Trade openness), reflecting 
that a competitive market (in a perfectly competitive market), namely the level of 
openness, leads to lower corruption (Wei, 2000; Ades and Di Tella, 1996, 1999); (3) 
exports of minerals and fuel (Rent), revealing that abundant rents generate 
opportunities for the occurrence of rent-seeking activity, and the rent-seeking activity 
is associated with a high corruption level (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005). 
In line with the viewpoint of Becker (1968) and Rose-Akerman (1996), the 
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consciousness of corruption can be expressed as a variable of the integrity of a 
municipality and its citizens. We employ a variable, which is used in the field of 
political economy, to reveal institutional features and to define corruption as an 
indicator of political power (Yeyati et al., 2010). Higher political power creates a 
motive for rent-seeking behavior by government officials and enhances the 
probability for corruption.  
We thus consider to introduce four institutional variables to reflect the social and 
political landscapes of host corruption, consisting of voice and accountability (Voice 
and Accountability, which reflects the rights of private citizens for free elections and 
to unionize), rule of law (Rule of Law, which captures the consciousness of a law 
governing nation), government effectiveness (Government Effectiveness, which 
captures the sense of the quality of public services), and regime durability (Durable, 
which captures the stability since the most recent regime succession).
6,7
 The range of 
institutional variables is [-2.5, 2.5], and they are collected from WGI of the World 
Bank, while Durable data are collected from the Polity IV dataset. In addition, we 
also consider the globalization variable in the model to check for the influence of host 
corruption. Based on the research of Attila (2008) and Becker et al. (2009), 
globalization acts as a bridge for the contagion of corruption across OBOR countries. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive summary of variables in OBOR countries; the 
mean of Corruption is -0.281, which is bigger than the world average of corruption 
(-0.086) and reflects that OBOR countries possibly face serious regional corruption. 
The means of three institutional variables (Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, 
and Voice and Accountability) are all less than zero, implying that institutional quality 
of OBOR countries still has large room for improvement. For the remaining control 
factors, such as Real GDP per Capita, Trade Openness, and Rent, the means are 
6576.716, 91.989, and 10.604, respectively. The mean of Globalization is 50.412, 
                                                             
6
 The theory is ambiguous on how these factors influence national corruption (La Palombara, 1994; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Huntington, 1996). 
7
 Regime durability (Durable) might lead to changes in the level of national corruption. In calculating 
the Durable value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the 
baseline “year zero” (value = 0), and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the Durable 
variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs. 
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implying that OBOR countries have relative higher host globalization level. 
3.2 Spatial autocorrelation test  
Table 3 reports the tests for spatial autocorrelation, including both Moran index, 
Geary index, and Getis-Ord index, by utilizing the control of the corruption variable. 
The Moran index is expressed in equation (3); the Getis-Ord index, which uses the 
variable control of the corruption variable, is expressed in equation (5); and Geary 
index is expressed in equation (6). As assumed, all coefficients of the Moran index, 
Geary index, and Getis-Ord index are almost significantly positive at the 5% level, 
reflecting that there exists the contagious corruption phenomenon in OBOR countries. 
The corruption interaction within this region is the obvious reason for the high 
corruption level. The range of Moran index autocorrelation coefficients is [0.188, 
0.380], the range of Geary index autocorrelation coefficients is [0.519, 0.744], while 
the Getis-Ord index ranges from 0.112 to 0.176. The Moran index and Getis-Ord 
index present a similar trend. When using different equations for calculation, the 
Geary index and Moran index present an opposite trend. The Moran index gets its 
maximum at 2005 and then fluctuates just like the Getis-Ord index fluctuation trend. 
The situations of Moran index, Geary index, and Getis-Ord index represent that the 
control of corruption level among OBOR countries has increased over the whole trend, 
and the mean control of corruption level still shows a serious situation. 
We then use the diagrams of Moran (Anselin, 2003) to prove the spatial 
correlation of corruption among the OBOR countries.
8
 The diagram of Moran is a 
scatter diagram of regional corruption and host corruption from the cross-countries’ 
perspective, where host corruption points at the X-axis and regional corruption points 
at the Y-axis. The numerical Moran index is expressed through an adjustment line 
(average relationship). The positive autocorrelation expresses that the OBOR 
countries have like standards in quadrants I and III; the negative autocorrelation 
expresses that the OBOR countries have like standards in quadrants II and IV. Figures 
1-3 clearly describe a positive correlation between host corruption and neighboring 
                                                             
8
 We use diagrams of Moran from the 33 OBOR countries, and Table 4 contains the countries’ full 
name and abbreviation. 
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countries for 2002, 2005, and 2013. These figures reveal that the contagious 
corruption phenomenon exists and that the accompanying grouping of OBOR 
countries leads to higher corruption levels (quadrant III). 
3.3 The contagion of corruption channel 
Common borders influence the more extensive value of the contagion of 
corruption channel, and therefore we intend to solve any concerns through the 
dynamic panel GMM approach. For the purpose of comparison, we investigate the 
contagion of corruption phenomenon via borders in Table 4,
9
 where columns 1-6 
present the results of the panel GMM model, and column 7 reflects the fixed effects 
regression on contagious corruption in OBOR countries. All models reveal a better fit 
in that the F-test and Wald-test are significant in columns 1-7, and the model selection 
diagnostic criteria are in accordance with AIC and SC. Table 4 reveals the results of 
the F-test and Wald-test in the fourth and fifth lines from the bottom. The bottom of 
Table 4 shows the spatial panel autocorrelation tests, and these results represent that 
the economic model has spatial autocorrelation (Global Moran MI, Global Geary GC, 
and LM Lag tests). The variable Corruptionit-1 has a positive effect at the 5% level, 
offering evidence that the corruption of OBOR countries is persistent. The positive 
coefficient of Corruptionit-1 reflects a dynamic corruption model where the lagged 
corruption level influences both current and former corruption levels. The higher 
corruption levels of OBOR countries in the future will dependent on a way to 
maintain the current and former corruption levels. The former control of corruption 
continue affecting the host corruption in the anticipate perspective (Herzfeld and 
Weiss, 2003). 
We hence discuss the effect of geographic border, where the positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of 
B
jtW Corruption  strongly indicates that the 
consciousness of host corruption is influenced by nearby countries’ corruption, which 
is estimated by the geographic spatial-weighted matrix of borders. This shows clear 
                                                             
9
 It is worth noting that apart from spatial-weighted matrix l corruption, all the variables in any 
econometric specification are defined at the national single country level. 
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evidence that the contagious corruption phenomenon is confirmed through the 
geographic spatial-weighted matrix of borders, in which 
B
jtW Corruption  represents a 
positive influence on the host control of corruption at the 5% significant level. It 
confirms the spread of corruption and infection from nearby countries, as the 
estimated results support the hypothesis that the host corruption is infected by nearby 
countries via the geographic border channel; for instance, transmigration, international 
trade, or civil interactivity (Rahim et al., 2013). It is noteworthy that there is an 
obvious difference between the fixed effects model and panel-GMM regression. Just 
like the Sekrafi and Sghaier (2016) empirical results, the 
D
jtW Corruption  
of the 
panel-GMM regression offers an unbiased estimated value versus the static 
regression. 
For the other factors of corruption, the connections among institutional variables, 
consisting of Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, and so on, are still debatable. It 
is noteworthy that Durable is not significant at the 10% level in OBOR countries. As 
shown in columns 2 and 6, other institutional factors have a positive effect on host 
corruption at the 5% significant level. These above results are in accordance with 
Abdih et al. (2012), who support that transparent institutions raise the control of 
corruption. There is more evidence of the different institutional variables bringing 
about various effects on corruption in OBOR countries, as shown in columns 3 and 6; 
Voice and Accountability and Government Effectiveness possess obvious significant 
effects on corruption after controlling for the geographic contagious channel. 
We next consider the economic factors of corruption. It is noteworthy that Rents 
in column 4 has a negative effect at the 5% significant level, proving that abundant 
rent-seeking behavior increases the host corruption. Introducing all control factors in 
column 5, the empirical results are mostly in accordance with previous literature 
except for Real GDP per Capita, which reflects the negative effect at the 5% 
significant level.
10
 The empirical result of Trade Openness is in accordance with 
                                                             
10
 Although the previous literature argues that higher GDP per capita usually leads to lower corruption, 
developed countries may not have lower corruption. The various factors of corruption from economy, 
politics, and society are the main reason. We also discover that all OECD countries are located in 
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foregoing research, which advises that the host corruption in the receiving countries is 
conducted through a reduction of FDI (foreign direct investment) (Larrain and 
Tavares, 2004). It is noteworthy that the effect of Trade Openness is tiny and Trade 
Openness is necessary for the level of corruption, revealing that trade exchanges 
among OBOR countries may be insufficient. Furthermore, the results in column (6) 
indicate the negative effect of globalization on the control of corruption at the 10% 
significant level, indicating a higher degree of globalization brings about a lower level 
of corruption (Akhter, 2004). 
We now investigate the contagion of the corruption effect through geographic 
distance. As shown in Table 5, all models reveal a better fit in that the F-test and 
Wald-test are significant in columns 1-6, and the model selection diagnostic criteria 
are in accordance with AIC and SC. Table 5 reflects the estimation results of the 
Wald-test and F-test at the fourth and fifth lines from the bottom. The bottom of Table 
5 shows the spatial panel autocorrelation tests, and the results indicate that the 
economic model has spatial autocorrelation (Global Moran MI, Global Geary GC, and 
LM Lag tests). The positive coefficient of the variable Corruptionit-1 indicates that 
country corruption has been anticipated through past levels, which is in line with the 
finding of Herzfeld and Weiss (2003).  
We therefore discuss the effect of geographic distance, where the statistically 
significant coefficient of 
D
jtW Corruption  strongly supports the hypothesis that the 
host corruption is influenced by nearby countries’ corruption, as estimated by the 
geographic spatial-weighted matrix of distance. The positive coefficient of 
D
jtW Corruption  
represents that geographic distance channels of corruption do exist, 
and that theit effect gradually decreases with an increase in distance. The estimated 
results point out that the consciousness of host corruption is infected by nearby 
countries through the geographic distance channel; for instance, international trade or 
international organizations’ interaction (Kaymak and Bektas, 2015). Considering 
                                                                                                                                                                              
quadrant I in the scatter diagram of spatial autocorrelation, meaning some developed countries have 
higher corruption in the real world. 
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other factors of corruption, the connections among institutional factors, including 
Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law, are still debatable. Similar to what is 
shown in Table 4, there is an obvious difference between static regression and 
panel-GMM regression in Table 5. Although the institutional variables have positive 
impacts significantly at the 5% level, Voice and Accountability especially plays a 
major role in the effect on corruption after controlling for the geographic contagious 
channel. The empirical results reflect that greater rights of citizens for free elections 
and unions in OBOR countries effectively increase control over the corruption level. 
The variables of economic impacts are not significant at the 10% level, demonstrating 
that the economic variables are not the primary factors. Hence, column (6) again 
indicates the negative effect of globalization at the 10% significant level, reflecting a 
higher degree of globalization leads to a lower level of corruption.  
In Table 4 we find that the corruption contagious effect of the geographic border 
channel is larger than the geographic distance channel. The coefficient of 
B
jtW Corruption  is larger than 
D
jtW Corruption  after controlling for the consistent 
variables of corruption. According to the argument of Accinelli and Sanchez (2012), 
host corruption has a demonstration effect on neighboring countries that share a 
border with each other. Countries with a common border always have similar 
economic, political, and cultural characteristics, and thus host corruption prefers to 
spread to countries on the border. In addition, the empirical results observed from the 
OBOR data support the view of Attila (2008) in that transitions lead to contagious 
corruption, which means local officials prefer to transfer their illegal assets to nearby 
areas (Attila, 2008). Above all, the empirical results represent that the border channel 
is better than the distance channel, and that the literature should use geographic border 
as the definition for neighbor in corruption research. 
4. Conclusion 
This research utilizes spatial econometrics to compare different potential 
contagious channels in OBOR countries over the period 2002-2013. The empirical 
results reveal that corruption autocorrelation does exist among these countries using 
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the Moran index and other forms of analysis, while the diagrams of the Moran scatter 
clearly describe a positive relation among OBOR countries. Furthermore, we use both 
the dynamic panel GMM approach and fixed effects model for estimating the 
corruption contagion effects and comparing these effects under the potential 
contagious channel. After comparing these channels, we see that contagious 
corruption does exist frequently through border neighbor countries versus other 
channels in OBOR countries. Finally, the host demonstration effect and transfer of 
illegal assets across countries through borders are the potential reasons for such a 
distinct contagious channel of corruption through borders.  
In line with the empirical results, we offer several policy implications as follows. 
First, our results support that the corruption of OBOR countries exhibits the 
contagious effect, revealing that anti-corruption is not just the duty of a particular 
country, but also an action required through cooperative governance from a regional 
angle. Therefore, policymakers should pay more attention on the proximity corruption 
via the border. These findings herein advise that governments should raise 
international collaboration for the purpose of preventing contagion from nearby 
corruption. Finally, multiple geographic contagious channels imply that government 
officials among OBOR countries should pay attention to both border and distance, 
especially the geographic border channel.  
We provide these findings of OBOR countries for scholars who are interested in 
this field. This evidence can help establish a government cooperation mechanism 
through Internet technology that provides anti-corruption networks among OBOR 
countries. It is also essential for all countries to enhance public consciousness, 
preserve and raise press freedom, enhance investigation into corruption, and utilize 
modern information technology to raise control over the corruption level (Hacek et al., 
2013). Referring to the studies of Becker et al. (2009) and Attila (2008), neighboring 
countries should enhance the supervision of cash flow and look for any opportunity of 
kicking back a portion of the stolen money. In addition, a specific task force on 
corruption across the nearby countries in OBOR should be established to deal with the 
contagious corruption phenomenon through borders.  
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Figure 1: 2002 Diagrams of Moran 
 
Figure 2: 2005 Diagrams of Moran 
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Figure 3: 2013 Diagrams of Moran 
Note: The countries’ full name and abbreviation proceed as follows:  Armenia (ARM), Azerbaijan (AZE), 
Bangladesh (BGD), Belarus (BLR), Bulgaria (BGR), China (CHN), Croatia (HRV), Estonia (EST), Georgia 
(GEO), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Israel (ISR), Jordan (JOR), Kazakhstan 
(KAZ), Kuwait (KWT), Latvia (LVA), Lebanon (LBN), Malaysia (MYS), Moldova (MDA), Nepal (NPL), 
Pakistan (PAK), Poland (POL), Romania (ROU), Saudi Arabia (KSA), Slovenia (SAU), Tajikistan (TJK), Thailand 
(THA), Turkey (TUR), and Ukraine (UKR). 
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Table 1 Literature of corruption in OBOR countries  
Author(s) Sample countries Period Method Research contents 
Quah (2001) Six countries in Asia 2001 Case study Three patterns of anti-corruption. 
McManus-Czubińska et al. (2004) Poland 2001 Case study Influence of corruption. 
Rock and Bonnett, (2004) East Asian countries 1980-1996 OLS regression East Asian corruption and economic growth in a 
comparative politics perspective. 
Budak (2006) Croatia 2002-2004 Comparative analysis Anti-corruption policy measures of Croatia. 
Wallace and Latcheva (2006) Central and Eastern European 
post-communist countries 
1998 Questionnaire Corruption and trust in public institutions. 
Azfar and Gurgur (2008) Philippines 2008 OLS regression and Probit 
regression 
Corruption on health and education outcomes in 
the Philippines. 
Javaid (2010) Pakistan 1996-2009 Case study The relationship between governance and 
corruption. 
Tavits (2010) Estonia 2004 Questionnaire Individual-level determinants of corruption. 
Mahmood (2010) Bangladesh 1999-2010 Case study Anti-corruption. 
Siddiquee (2010) Malaysia 1995-2008 Questionnaire The critical overview of the anti-corruption 
strategies in Malaysia. 
Rose and Mishler (2010) Russia 2007 Questionnaire Individual perception and experience of paying 
bribes. 
Nguyen et al. (2012) Vietnam 2005 OLS regression Corruption, growth, and public governance. 
Batory (2012) Central Eastern Europe countries  2012 Comparative analysis Law and anti-corruption in Central Eastern 
Europe countries. 
Glüpker (2013) Croatia and Macedonia 2004-2007 Case study Minority rights and anti-corruption policies. 
Hacek et al. (2013) Slovenia 2002-2011 Questionnaire Corruption and trust in political and 
administrative institutions. 
Satpayev (2014) Developing countries 1999-2011 Comparative analysis Influence of low governance quality. 
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Kapeli (2015) Malaysia 1995-2014 Questionnaire Anti-Corruption Initiatives in Malaysia. 
Katsios (2015) Greece 1999-2003 Case study Underground economy and corruption 
Roy (2016) India 1947-1991 Case study Privatization, kindred phenomena, and corruption 
in India. 
Sidorkin and Vorobyev (2017) Russia 2005-2012 Panel logit regression Political cycles and corruption in Russian regions. 
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Table 2 Descriptive analysis  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Corruption 396 -0.281 0.625 -1.488 1.292 
Rule of Law 396 -0.144 0.681 -1.441 1.164 
Government Effectiveness 396 -0.028 0.661 -1.261 1.367 
Voice and Accountability 396 -0.300 0.891 -2.098 1.157 
Real GDP per Capita 396 6576.716 7515.739 276.291 36356.650 
Trade Openness 396 91.989 38.382 26.858 210.373 
Rents 396 10.604 17.769 0.002 89.220 
Durable 396 20.646 19.502 0.000 87.000 
Globalization 396 50.412 28.592 0 87.290 
Notes: Corruption reflects the extent of perception in which public power is exercised for private gain. GDP per 
capita (Real GDP per Capita) reflects a higher level of income may increase corruption. Trade openness (Trade 
openness) reveals a competitive market. Exports of minerals and fuel (Rent) imply that abundant rents may create 
opportunities for rent-seeking behavior, and the rent-seeking behavior is associateed with a high corruption level. 
Voice and Accountability captures citizens’ right to free elections and association. Rule of Law reflects the extent of 
perceptions. Government Effectiveness reflects perceptions of the quality of public services. Durable means the 
number of years since the most recent regime change. Globalization means the level in which a country 
participates in trend of globalization.   
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Table 3 Test for spatial autocorrelation: 2002-2013 
 
 Border Distance 
Year Moran’s I Z p Geary'C Z p Getis-Ord Z p 
2002 0.309 2.080a 0.019 0.623 -2.155a 0.016 0.112 2.701a 0.003 
2003 0.192 1.361b 0.087 0.657 -2.000a 0.023 0.123 2.888a 0.002 
2004 0.291 1.952a 0.025 0.602 -2.333a 0.010 0.146 3.314a 0.000 
2005 0.380 2.495a 0.006 0.519 -2.823a 0.002 0.176 3.881a 0.000 
2006 0.192 1.358b 0.087 0.698 -1.745a 0.041 0.128 2.898a 0.001 
2007 0.276 1.865a 0.031 0.646 -2.063a 0.020 0.140 3.199a 0.001 
2008 0.269 1.862a 0.034 0.635 -2.124a 0.017 0.149 3.374a 0.000 
2009 0.278 1.891a 0.029 0.631 -2.126a 0.017 0.144 3.292a 0.000 
2010 0.281 1.899a 0.029 0.633 -2.140a 0.016 0.140 3.211a 0.001 
2011 0.251 1.720a 0.043 0.664 -1.942a 0.026 0.155 3.51a 0.000 
2012 0.188 1.334b 0.091 0.744 -1.478b 0.070 0.130 3.039a 0.001 
2013 0.192 1.361b 0.087 0.742 -1.494b 0.068 0.121 2.853a 0.002 
Notes: 
a
 and
 b
 indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4 Geographic border channel of contagious corruption 
Variables/Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
B
jtW Corruption  0.133
a
 
(4.60) 
0.132
a
 
(4.88) 
0.132
a
 
(4.58) 
0.130
a
 
(4.51) 
0.130
a
 
(4.82) 
0.129
a
 
(4.87) 
0.166
a
 
(2.62) 
Corruptionit-1 0.862
a
 
(8.31) 
0.786
a
 
(10.32) 
0.864
a
 
(8.26) 
0.882
a
 
(8.26) 
0.815
a
 
(9.51) 
0.834
a
 
(10.01) 
 
Rule of Law  0.246a 
(3.21) 
  0.220
a
 
(2.82) 
0.221
a
 
(2.85) 
0.449
a
 
(6.18) 
Government effectiveness  0.254a 
(4.04) 
  0.253
a
 
(4.01) 
0.250
a
 
(3.96) 
0.343
a
 
(5.40) 
Voice and Accountability  0.258a 
(3.94) 
  0.253
a
 
(3.84) 
0.255
a
 
(3.85) 
0.308
a
 
(5.69) 
Durable   1.081 
(0.28) 
 0.001 
(0.48) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
-0.008
a
 
(-4.33) 
Real GDP per Capita    0.045 
(0.28) 
0.077 
(0.48) 
0.045 
(0.40) 
0.082 
(1.45) 
Trade Openness    0.002 
(0.21) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(1.51) 
Rents    -0.002a 
(-2.37) 
0.002
a
 
(2.09) 
0.002
a
 
(2.00) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
Globalization      -0.006b 
(-1.89) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
Constant -0.024a 
(-3.77) 
-0.016
a
 
(-2.13) 
-0.034
a
 
(-2.91) 
-0.070
a
 
(-0.44) 
-0.143
a
 
(-0.67) 
-0.020 
(-0.46) 
-0.627
a
 
(-1.65) 
F 45.150a 37.438a 30.214a 19.225a 19.457a 18.575a 29.46 
Wald Test 90.299 187.18
7 
90.641 19.225 175.11
5 
185.74
9 
89.254 
AIC 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.015 - 
SC 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.017 - 
Global Moran MI 0.027 0.122 0.038 0.066 0.173 0.106 - 
Global Geary GC 0.897 0.848 0.892 0.871 0.808 0.843 - 
LM Lag 4.774 6.804 5.315 4.724 5.252 5.538 - 
Notes: 
a
 and
 b
 indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. AIC and SC 
indicate panel model selection diagnostic criteria, seeking the optimal model through a lower 
calculated value after controlling enough variables. Global Moran MI, Global Geary GC, and LM Lag 
indicate spatial panel autocorrelation tests. If the calculated value is larger than the critical value, then 
the original hypothesis is rejected. Columns 1-6 show the estimations of panel GMM model while 
column 7 provides the results of fixed effects regression. 
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Table 5 Geographic distance channel of contagious corruption 
Variables/Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
D
jtW Corruption  0.047
a
 
(3.70) 
0.053
a
 
(4.45) 
0.046
a
 
(3.63) 
0.045
a
 
(3.57) 
0.051
a
 
(4.28) 
0.062
a
 
(4.87) 
0.102
a
 
(4.40) 
Corruptionit-1 0.908
a
 
(8.81) 
0.840
a
 
(11.25) 
0.913
a
 
(8.84) 
0.927
a
 
(8.81) 
0.865
a
 
(10.41) 
0.908
a 
(8.65) 
 
Rule of Law  0.227a 
(2.94) 
  0.205a 
(2.62) 
0.190
a
 
(2.15) 
0.455
a
 
(6.36) 
Government Effectiveness  0.228a 
(3.57) 
  0.229a 
(3.57) 
0.264
a
 
(3.66) 
0.326
a
 
(5.24) 
Voice and Accountability  0.314a 
(4.64) 
  0.307a 
(4.51) 
0.404
a
 
(5.56) 
0.313
a
 
(5.89) 
Durable   0.003 
(1.09) 
 0.001 
(0.35) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
-0.007
a
 
(-4.20) 
Real GDP per Capita    0.041 
(0.25) 
0.068 
(0.30) 
-0.020 
(-0.12) 
0.063 
(1.13) 
Trade Openness    0.003 
(0.50) 
0.002 
(0.30) 
0.008 
(1.06) 
0.001 
(1.00) 
Rents    0.002a 
(2.24) 
0.002
b
 
(1.92) 
0.003
b
 
(1.93) 
-0.001 
(-0.70) 
Globalization      -0.006b 
(-1.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
Constant -0.010 
(-1.39) 
0.003 
(0.33) 
-0.017
b
 
(-1.7) 
-0.038 
(-0.37) 
-0.085 
(-0.50) 
-0.054 
(-0.44) 
-0.352 
(-0.93) 
F  45.612
a
 
39.926
a 
31.008
a 
19.483
a 
20.583
a 
15.965
 
a 
31.84 
Wald Test 91.222 199.63
1 
93.024 97.415 185.24
2 
159.66
4 
75.622 
AIC 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.017 - 
SC 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.019 - 
Global Moran MI 0.018 0.022 0.001 0.028 0.032 0.058 - 
Global Geary GC 0.992 0.985 1.013 0.982 0.972 0.825 - 
LM Lag 2.123 2.775 0.318 3.156 4.181 4.173 - 
Notes: Same as Table 4.  
 
